[![][1]][2]
[![][3]][4]
[![][5]][6]
[![][7]][8]
[![][9]][10]
[![][11]][12]
[![][13]][14]
[![][15]][16]
![][17]
>
>
> [ ![][18] Print This Story][19]![][20][![][21] E-mail This Story][22]![][20]
>
> [![][23]][24]
>
> AUDIO Waxman Wants Rice-9/11 Hearings -- 02.17.05 Quicktime
[Dial-Up][25] | [ Broadband][26]
Windows Media
[ Dial-Up][27] | [ Broadband][28]
>
> **Also see below:**
[9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings about Hijackings][29] a€¢
>
> **Request for Hearings by House Members**
By Rep. Henry A. Waxman; Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney
Ranking Democrat House Committee on Government Reform; Member of Congress
t r u t h o u t | Statement
>
> Thursday 10 February 2005
>
> The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
>
> Dear Mr. Chairman:
>
> We are writing to request that our Committee hold hearings to investigate two extremely serious questions raised by an article that appeared in this morning's New York Times. The first question is whether the Administration misused the classification process to withhold, for political reasons, official 9/11 Commission staff findings detailing how federal aviation officials received multiple intelligence reports warning of airline hijackings and suicide attacks before September 11. The second question relates to the veracity of statements, briefings, and testimony by then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice regarding this issue.
>
> **Background**
>
> This morning's New York Times reported that in "the months before the Sept. 11 attacks, federal aviation officials reviewed dozens of intelligence reports that warned about Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, some of which specifically discussed airline hijackings and suicide operations." [[1][29]] The article explained that the Federal Aviation Administration "received 52 intelligence reports" that mentioned Osama bin Laden or Al Qaeda prior to September 11, 2001, and that the FAA warned airports that if "the intent of the hijacker is not to exchange hostages for prisoners, but to commit suicide in a spectacular explosion, a domestic hijacking would probably be preferable."
>
> This information was included in a staff report by the 9/11 Commission dated August 26, 2004. The 9/11 Commission report found that there was "intelligence that indicated a real and growing threat leading up to 9/11," but that this intelligence "did not stimulate significant increases in security procedures." Although the report did not find that the government had advance information about the specific September 11, 2001, attacks, it reported that the FAA took various measures to warn airport security officials about "the possibility of a suicide hijacking."
>
> **Declassification Process**
>
> The first question Committee hearings should address is whether the Bush Administration abused the classification process to improperly withhold the 9/11 Commission findings from Congress and the public until after the November elections and the confirmation of Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State. Although the 9/11 Commission staff completed its report on August 26, 2004, the Bush Administration refused to declassify the findings until January 28, 2005, less than 48 hours after Ms. Rice was confirmed as Secretary of State. [[2][30]] At that time, the Department of Justice delivered both a classified version and an unclassified version to the National Archives, the agency charged with collecting and retaining all 9/11 Commission documents.
>
> During the period between August 26 and January 28, the Administration was reportedly reviewing the Commission's report to determine whether it contained any information that should be classified in the interest of national security. Problems with this process had been raised previously by the 9/11 Commission. [[3][31]]
>
> The Committee should investigate the process by which the Administration handled the declassification, redaction, and release of this 9/11 Commission report. Specifically, the Committee should investigate the following questions:
>
>> (1) What was the process for declassifying, redacting, and releasing this report, and who specifically was responsible for these actions?
>>
>> (2) Were there political considerations behind the declassification, redaction, or timing of the release of the report?
>>
>> (3) What were the specific rationales for each redaction in the report? Were these redactions appropriate?
>
> On December 2, 2004, we joined with Rep. Christopher Shays, Chairman of the National Security Subcommittee, and 23 other members in a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft specifically requesting the 9/11 Commission report at issue. [[4][32]] We noted that "there have been a number of calls for its release, to no avail," and we expressed concern that "politics may be playing a role in its release." This specific congressional request was apparently ignored by the Administration. When the staff report was declassified on January 28 and sent to the National Archives, no notice was provided to us.
>
> **Statements by Ms. Rice**
>
> The Committee should also examine the process by which Ms. Rice investigated and researched intelligence reports regarding airline suicide attacks prior to making public statements regarding this issue, testifying before the 9/11 Commission on April 8, 2004, and advising President Bush.
>
> During her tenure as President Bush's National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice made several categorical statements asserting that there were never any warnings that terrorists might use airplanes in suicide attacks. On May 16, 2002, for example, Ms. Rice made the following statement at a White House press briefing:
>
> I don't think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, take another one and slam it into the Pentagon, that they would try to use an airplane as a missile, a hijacked airplane as a missile. [[5][33]]
>
> When Ms. Rice testified under oath before the 9/11 Commission on April 8, 2004, the Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, asked her about her knowledge of a possible suicide attack using airplanes. After acknowledging that her previous statement generated "concern about what I might have known or we might have known," she stated as follows:
>
> I said no one could have imagined them taking a plane, slamming it into the Pentagon - I'm paraphrasing now - into the World Trade Center, using planes as a missile. As I said to you in the private session, I probably should have said "I" could not have imagined, because within two days, people started to come to me and say, "Oh, but there were these reports in 1998 and 1999, the intelligence community did look at information about this."
>
> To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, this kind of analysis about the use of airplanes as weapons actually was never briefed to us. I cannot tell you that there might not have been a report here or a report there that reached somebody in our midst. All that I can tell you is that it was not in the August 6th memo, using planes as a weapon, and I do not remember any reports to us, a kind of strategic warning that planes might be used as a weapon. In fact, there were some reports done in '98 and '99. I think I was - I was certainly not aware of them at the time that I spoke. [[6][34]]
>
> The President, who was advised by Ms. Rice about national security matters, also repeatedly made definitive statements claiming absolute ignorance regarding the possibility of terrorists using airplanes in suicide missions. For example, President Bush stated on national television:
>
> Had I known that the enemy was going to use airplanes to strike America, to attack us, I would have used every resource, every asset, every power of this government to protect the American people. [[7][35]]
>
> One possibility raised by these facts is that Ms. Rice was unaware of the FAA warnings when she appeared before the press and testified before the 9/11 Commission. This would raise serious questions about her preparation and competency. Another possibility is that Ms. Rice knew about the FAA warnings but provided misleading information to the public and the Commission. Neither of these possibilities would reflect well on Ms. Rice. Perhaps there are other more innocent explanations for these seeming inconsistencies.
>
> Given the gravity of these questions and significance of the new disclosures, the Committee should investigate what Ms. Rice knew, when she knew it, and why she testified as she did. The public has the right to expect that senior Administration officials will be candid on matters of national security, especially when they involve the tragic events of September 11. An investigation is needed to determine whether this standard was met in this instance.
>
> **Document Request**
>
> Finally, we request that the Committee obtain from the Administration the following documents identified in the New York Times article this morning:
>
>> (1) A full, unredacted copy of the classified version of the 9/11 Commission report on FAA intelligence warnings delivered to the National Archives;
>>
>> (2) Full and unredacted copies of the 52 intelligence reports received by the FAA;
>>
>> (3) Full and unredacted copies of the CD-ROM presentation distributed to airlines and airports in 2001; and
>>
>> (4) Full and unredacted copies of slides, reports, or other documents used in classified briefings for security officials at 19 airports in mid-2001.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
>
> Carolyn B. Maloney
Member of Congress
>
> * * *
>
> [[1][36]] 9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings about Hijackings, New York Times (Feb. 10, 2005).
>
> [[2][37]] Rice Is Confirmed Amid Criticism, Washington Post (Jan. 27, 2005).
>
> [[3][38]] See, e.g., 9/11 Commission Says U.S. Agencies Slow Its Inquiry, New York Times (July 9, 2003); Bush Weighing Decision on Release of Classified Documents to Sept. 11, New York Times (Oct. 28, 2003).
>
> [[4][39]] Letter from Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney et al. to Attorney General John Ashcroft (Dec. 2, 2004).
>
> [[5][40]] Condoleezza Rice Holds News Briefing on Pre-9/11 Intelligence Information, FDCH Political Transcripts (May 16, 2002).
>
> [[6][41]] Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Apr. 8, 2004) (online at www.9-11commission.gov/archive/hearing9/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-04-08.pdf).
>
> [[7][42]] Inside Politics, Cable News Network (Mar. 25, 2004). See also George W. Bush Delivers Remarks and Presents the Commander-In-Chief's Trophy, FDCH Political Transcripts (May 17, 2002) ("Had I known that the enemy was going to use airplanes to kill on that fateful morning, I would have done everything in my power to protect the American people"); Wolf Blitzer Reports, CNN (Apr. 5, 2004) ("Make no mistake about it, if we had known that the enemy was going to fly airplanes into our buildings, we would have done everything in our power to stop it"); Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Interview with Rush Limbaugh (As Released by the Pentagon), FDCH Political Transcripts (May 16, 2002) ("Well I guess I'd begin by saying it's really much ado about nothing. To my knowledge there was no warning, no alert as to suicide attackers in airplanes").
>
>
>
> * * *
>
> [Go to Original][43]
>
> **9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings about Hijackings**
By Eric Lichtblau
The New York Times
>
> Thursday 10 February 2005
>
> Washington - In the months before the Sept. 11 attacks, federal aviation officials reviewed dozens of intelligence reports that warned about Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, some of which specifically discussed airline hijackings and suicide operations, according to a previously undisclosed report from the 9/11 commission.
>
> But aviation officials were "lulled into a false sense of security," and "intelligence that indicated a real and growing threat leading up to 9/11 did not stimulate significant increases in security procedures," the commission report concluded.
>
> The report discloses that the Federal Aviation Administration, despite being focused on risks of hijackings overseas, warned airports in the spring of 2001 that if "the intent of the hijacker is not to exchange hostages for prisoners, but to commit suicide in a spectacular explosion, a domestic hijacking would probably be preferable."
>
> The report takes the F.A.A. to task for failing to pursue domestic security measures that could conceivably have altered the events of Sept. 11, 2001, like toughening airport screening procedures for weapons or expanding the use of on-flight air marshals. The report, completed last August, said officials appeared more concerned with reducing airline congestion, lessening delays, and easing airlines' financial woes than deterring a terrorist attack.
>
> The Bush administration has blocked the public release of the full, classified version of the report for more than five months, officials said, much to the frustration of former commission members who say it provides a critical understanding of the failures of the civil aviation system. The administration provided both the classified report and a declassified, 120-page version to the National Archives two weeks ago and, even with heavy redactions in some areas, the declassified version provides the firmest evidence to date about the warnings that aviation officials received concerning the threat of an attack on airliners and the failure to take steps to deter it.
>
> Among other things, the report says that leaders of the F.A.A. received 52 intelligence reports from their security branch that mentioned Mr. bin Laden or Al Qaeda from April to Sept. 10, 2001. That represented half of all the intelligence summaries in that time.
>
> Five of the intelligence reports specifically mentioned Al Qaeda's training or capability to conduct hijackings, the report said. Two mentioned suicide operations, although not connected to aviation, the report said.
>
> A spokeswoman for the F.A.A., the agency that bears the brunt of the commission's criticism, said Wednesday that the agency was well aware of the threat posed by terrorists before Sept. 11 and took substantive steps to counter it, including the expanded use of explosives detection units.
>
> "We had a lot of information about threats," said the spokeswoman, Laura J. Brown. "But we didn't have specific information about means or methods that would have enabled us to tailor any countermeasures."
>
> She added: "After 9/11, the F.A..A. and the entire aviation community took bold steps to improve aviation security, such as fortifying cockpit doors on 6,000 airplanes, and those steps took hundreds of millions of dollars to implement."
>
> The report, like previous commission documents, finds no evidence that the government had specific warning of a domestic attack and says that the aviation industry considered the hijacking threat to be more worrisome overseas.
>
> "The fact that the civil aviation system seems to have been lulled into a false sense of security is striking not only because of what happened on 9/11 but also in light of the intelligence assessments, including those conducted by the F.A.A.'s own security branch, that raised alarms about the growing terrorist threat to civil aviation throughout the 1990's and into the new century," the report said.
>
> In its previous findings, including a final report last July that became a best-selling book, the 9/11 commission detailed the harrowing events aboard the four hijacked flights that crashed on Sept. 11 and the communications problems between civil aviation and military officials that hampered the response. But the new report goes further in revealing the scope and depth of intelligence collected by federal aviation officials about the threat of a terrorist attack.
>
> The F.A.A. "had indeed considered the possibility that terrorists would hijack a plane and use it as a weapon," and in 2001 it distributed a CD-ROM presentation to airlines and airports that cited the possibility of a suicide hijacking, the report said. Previous commission documents have quoted the CD's reassurance that "fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction."
>
> Aviation officials amassed so much information about the growing threat posed by terrorists that they conducted classified briefings in mid-2001 for security officials at 19 of the nation's busiest airports to warn of the threat posed in particular by Mr. bin Laden, the report said.
>
> Still, the 9/11 commission concluded that aviation officials did not direct adequate resources or attention to the problem.
>
> "Throughout 2001, the senior leadership of the F.A.A. was focused on congestion and delays within the system and the ever-present issue of safety, but they were not as focused on security," the report said.
>
> The F.A.A. did not see a need to increase the air marshal ranks because hijackings were seen as an overseas threat, and one aviation official told the commission said that airlines did not want to give up revenues by providing free seats to marshals.
>
> The F.A.A. also made no concerted effort to expand their list of terror suspects, which included a dozen names on Sept. 11, the report said. The former head of the F.A.A.'s civil aviation security branch said he was not aware of the government's main watch list, called Tipoff, which included the names of two hijackers who were living in the San Diego area, the report said.
>
> Nor was there evidence that a senior F.A.A. working group on security had ever met in 2001 to discuss "the high threat period that summer," the report said.
>
> Jane F. Garvey, the F.A.A. administrator at the time, told the commission "that she was aware of the heightened threat during the summer of 2001," the report said. But several other senior agency officials "were basically unaware of the threat," as were senior airline operations officials and veteran pilots, the report said.
>
> The classified version of the commission report quotes extensively from circulars prepared by the F.A.A. about the threat of terrorism, but many of those references have been blacked out in the declassified version, officials said.
>
> Several former commissioners and staff members said they were upset and disappointed by the administration's refusal to release the full report publicly.
>
> "Our intention was to make as much information available to the public as soon as possible," said Richard Ben-Veniste, a former Sept. 11 commission member.
>
> [an error occurred while processing this directive]
>
> _(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. t r u t h o u t has no affiliation whatsoever with the originator of this article nor is t r u t h o u t endorsed or sponsored by the originator.)_
>
> _"Go to Original" links are provided as a convenience to our readers and allow for verification of authenticity. However, as originating pages are often updated by their originating host sites, the versions posted on TO may not match the versions our readers view when clicking the "Go to Original" links._
>
> [ ![][18] Print This Story][19]![][20][![][21] E-mail This Story][22]![][20]
![][20]
| [t r u t h o u t][2] | [issues][8] | [environment][44] | [labor][45] | [women][46] | [health][47] | [voter rights][48] | [multimedia][12] | [donate][49] | [contact][14] | [subscribe][6] | [about us][50]
[1]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.nav.LTR_t_1.gif
[2]: http://www.truthout.org/index.htm
[3]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.nav.LTR_d_1.gif
[4]: https://secure.entango.com/donate/pkXd5Fr9GE4
[5]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.nav.LTR_s_1.gif
[6]: http://truthout.org/subscribe.htm
[7]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.nav.LTR_i_3.gif
[8]: http://www.truthout.org/issues.shtml
[9]: http://truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.nav.LTR_e_3.gif
[10]: http://truthout.org/environment.shtml
[11]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.nav.LTR_m_2.gif
[12]: http://www.truthout.org/multimedia.htm
[13]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.nav.LTR_c_2.gif
[14]: http://www.truthout.org/contact.htm
[15]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.nav.LTR_about.gif
[16]: http://www.truthout.org/aboutus.shtml
[17]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/1.LGO.issues_1.gif
[18]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.print.gif
[19]: http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/37/9067/printer
[20]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.ClrSpc.indent_2.gif
[21]: http://www.truthout.org/imgs.site_01/2.mail.gif
[22]: #
[23]: http://www.feedburner.com/fb/images/pub/xml_button.gif
[24]: http://feeds.feedburner.com/TRUTHOUT (Subscribe to my feed, t r u t h o u t | News Politics)
[25]: http://websrvr20.audiovideoweb.com/avwebdswebsrvr2143/00waxman_021505.mov
[26]: http://websrvr20.audiovideoweb.com/avwebdswebsrvr2143/00waxman_021505.mp3
[27]: http://win20ca.audiovideoweb.com/ca20win15004/00waxman_021505_56k.wma
[28]: http://win20ca.audiovideoweb.com/ca20win15004/00waxman_021505.wma
[29]: #1
[30]: #2
[31]: #3
[32]: #4
[33]: #5
[34]: #6
[35]: #7
[36]: #a
[37]: #b
[38]: #c
[39]: #d
[40]: #e
[41]: #f
[42]: #g
[43]: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/10/politics/10terror.html
[44]: http://www.truthout.org/environment.shtml
[45]: http://www.truthout.org/labor.shtml
[46]: http://www.truthout.org/women.shtml
[47]: http://www.truthout.org/health.shtml
[48]: http://www.truthout.org/voters.rights.htm
[49]: http://www.truthout.org/donations/
[50]: http://truthout.org/aboutus.shtml